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ABSTRACT
A conceptual design of a model based failure
detection and diagnosis system is developed for the
space shuttle main engine. Tiffs design relies on the
accurate and reliable identification of the
parameters of the highly nonlinear and very
complex engine. The design approach was
presented in some detail and results for a failed
valve are presented. These preliminary results
verify that the developed parameter identification
technique together with a neural network
classifier can be used for this purpose.
INTRODUCTION
This paper describes a model based failure
diagnosis system based on a neural network
classifier for the space shuttle main engine (SSME).
The system may be used to monitor the life cycle
of engine components and for the early detection,
isolation and the diagnosis of engine failures. As
such, the proposed system will be one part of a
larger, engine health monitoring system [1]. The
health monitoring system will allow for
accommodation of failures, reduce maintenance
cost, increase engine availability, and be one part of
an integrated, intelligent control system [2] for the
SSME. A description of SSME dynamics and its
modeling is given in a study by Duyar, Guo and
Merrill [3]. A summary of the major failures of
the SSME that have occurred are outlined by
Cikanek [4]. Several authors survey [5,6,7,8]
the available methods and approaches for failure
detection and diagnosis. In particular the survey by
Isermann[6] gives several examples of the use of
identification techniques for process failure
detection.
A failure is the abnormal behavior of a
component due to physical change in the
component. A failure event often impairs or
deteriorates the system's ability to perform its
specified tasks or mission. The detection task is
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defined as the act of identifying the presence of an
unspecified failure. After a failure is detected, then
the failure must be isolated to the component that
has failed. During the process of isolation the
magnitude of the failure may be estimated. Failure
diagnosis is the isolation and estimation of a failure
mode. Once a failure is detected and diagnosed,
the failure can be accommodated through
reconfiguration of the system. Reconfiguration
includes both hardware actions (e.g., activating back
- up systems) and software tasks ( e.g., adjusting
the feedback control gains). The detection and
diagnostic tasks may be accomplished by an on -
board processor, on line and in real time for failure
accommodation, as well as by an off line processor
which analyzes recorded data for life cycle analysis
and preventive maintenance.
Initially a brief description of the conceptual
design of the model based failure detection and
diagnostic system (FDDS) is given. This is
followed by a description of the method used to
design the detection and diagnostic system. The
design is applied to the detection of simulated data
of a stuck valve to demonstrate the performance of
the FDDS.
CONCEPTUAL DESIGN
Model based failure detection methods rely on
the determination of changes appearing in the
system due to the existence of a failure, in
comparison to the normal status of the system. For
example, in aerospace applications the failure of
control actuators may manifest themselves as shifts
in the parameters of control gain matrix. Failures of
sensors may take the form of abrupt changes in the
parameters of the output matrix, or increases in
measurement noise. These changes are determined
by comparing the parameters of the observed
process with the parameters obtained from the
model of the normal process. The differences
between these parameters are called residuals. The
residualsandtheirpatternsare analyzed for failure
detection and diagnosis by comparing them with the
known failure signatures of the process.
Failure signatures, which show the effect of a
failure on the parameters, are generated by inducing
failures in the performance model of the process.
Failure diagnosis is accomplished by training a
neural network classifier to recognize the pattern of
the respective failure signatures.
The design of the FDDS is accomplished in
three stages: process modeling, residual generation
and failure detection and diagnostic classifier
design. In the following sections the methods used
in these stages are briefly explained.
PROCESS MODELLING
A complete nonlinear dynamic simulation of
SSME performance was developed by Rocketdyne
Division of Rockwell International Corporation[9].
In this study, this nonlinear model is considered as
the unknown process. It is used for the generation
of failure signatures by modifying the actuator
models to simulate failure. The input output data
generated from this simulation is also used to
identify the parameters of the engine. Due to its
size and complexity (40 min. CPU time for 20 sec.
of real time operation with a VAX 8800), this
nonlinear simulation cannot be used to generate
data in real time to describe the normal mode of
operation.
An off-line system identification algorithm
developed by Eldem and Duyar [10] and the data
generated from the nonlinear performance
simulation are used to obtain linear point models of
the SSME at twenty five different operating points.
The inputs of these models are the rotary motion of
the valve actuator outputs of the oxidizer preburner
oxidizer valve (OPOV), _oPov, and fuel preburner
oxidizer valve (FPOV), _,ov. The point models
have measurable state variables which make them
more suitable for failure detection and diagnostic
studies, since the need for state estimation is
eliminated. The outputs which are also the state
variables, are the chamber inlet pressure, Pc,
mixture ratio, MR, high pressure fuel turbine speed,
Sm,vr, and high pressure oxidizer turbine speed,
SHPOT.
Two models of the SSME are utilized in the
design of the FDDS: a linear state variable observer
or state variable filter, and a linear state space
model of the normal operation of the engine.
Consider the discrete state space representation
of the engine, linearized about one operating point.
x(n+l) = A x(n) + B u(n)
y(n) = C x(n)
(1)
(2)
where x, u and y are the deviations of the state, the
input and the output vectors about an operating
point. For mathematical simplicity, it is assumed
that the system is not subject to disturbances and to
sensor noise. Following the work of Eldem and
Duyar [10], it is assumed that the system is in or-
canonical form.
To estimate the states from the measured input
and output data, a state variable filter
xf(n+l) = Axf(n) + Bu(n) + K[y(n) - Cxt(n)] (3)
yt(n) = C xt(n) (4)
is used. Here the subscript f denotes the estimated
values obtained from the filter. The observer gain
matrix K is selected as a deadbeat observer gain
satisfying the following relations:
C=[0:H "l]
A =At +KHC
At.--0
(HC)tAo_ = 0
(HC),Ao, K j = 0, 0<l<(bt , - Itj)
(5)
Here the subscript i and j denote the r th row and
j'th column respectively. Here t% is a lower left
triangular structure matrix which consists of zeros
and ones only and is determined by the
observability indices, It,, where k associates Itk with
the k'th output. Using these relations, E.qs. 1 and 2
can be solved to give
xf(n) = Ao*x(0) + _"'[KH:B] [y(n-i)l
N(n-i) l
(6)
where, It = max{ l.t_ 1. Using the nillpotency of A o
the above equation yields the state variable filter
equation
xgn) = LAo"'[K:B] ly(n-i) l (7)
lu(n-i) I
for n>la
yf(n) = Cxt(n ) (8)
which can be used to estimate the states from the
measurements of the input and the output data.
Unlike the state variable filter the state space
model of the engine estimates the state variables
from the measurement of the input data only. The
equation describing the state space model of the
engine is given below:
x_(n) ffi Y-,Ao"'[K:B] [y.(n-i)[ (9)
lu(n-i) I
for n>_t
y.(n) = Cx_(n) (10)
Here the subscript m denotes the_ variables
estimated by the model.
Both the state variable filter and the state space
model are tested by comparing their prediction with
the actual output obtained from the nonlinear
simulation. The point models can predict the
output of the nonlinear simulation with very good
accuracy [11]. These point models are linked to
obtain a simplified quasi linear model of the SSME,
valid within its full range of operation [12]. The
parameters of the point models are regressed with
the parameters determining the nominal operating
conditions. The mixture ratio and the chamber
pressure are considered as the parameters which
determine a nominal operating condition. This
simplified model is also tested by designing an
input signal as shown in Figure 1. The comparison
of the responses of the linked model and the
nonlinear simulation again indicated good
agreement as shown in Figures 2 and 3. Table 1
presents the standard error of estimates.
RESIDUAL GENERATION
As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that failures
are indicated by changes in the parameters of the
system as well as by internal, observable, but not
necessarily measured, process state variables. The
state variables can be estimated by a filter or a state
space model based on the known process
parameters. The parameters of the process can be
determined by using a system identification
technique. Then, residuals can be generated by
taking the difference between the actual parameters
and the observed parameters.
Two kinds of residuals may be generated:
1)parameter, by comparing the identified parameters
of the engine with the normal parameters, and
2)output, by taking the difference between the
actual output and the output obtained from the
estimated state variables. The simplest test to
detect a failure is a comparison of residual
magnitudes to a threshold value. Using the
distribution of the variances of the residuals under
failure free conditions, the threshold values can be
determined to minimize false alarms and missed
detections using the Neyman-Pearson criterionl3.
In this study, the state variables of the system
are used for the generation of output residuals.
With the observed state variables, residuals are
generated between the measured output and the
output obtained using the observed state variables
as:
_iyt(n) = y(n) - Cxt(n) (11)
Measured output and the output obtained from the
state space model are also used to generate
additional residuals as:
8yz(n) = y(n) - C x.(n) (12)
Here subscript e denotes the estimated values.
These residuals are generated by inducing stuck
valve failures in the nonlinear dynamic simulation
of the SSME. Both the OPOV and the FPOV are
considered for this purpose. Data are obtained at
various angles for which these valves are stuck.
Figure 4 shows the residuals obtained for two of
the outputs, chamber inlet pressure and the mixture
ratio, by using Equation 12.
FAILURE DETECTION AND DIAGNOSIS
A neural network classifier is used for failure
detection and diagnosis purposes. Following the
work of Dietz, Kiech and Ali [14], a two layer
network architecture combined with a back
propagation algorithm is selected. Top level neural
networks detect the existence of a failure and
classify the type of failures. The lower level
networks classify the severity of the failures after
their type are determined at the top level.
In the example considered in this paper, output
residuals obtained in the previous section are used
to train the network to detect and diagnose OPOV
and FPOV stuck valve failures. Two top level
networks are used to classify the failure type as
shown in Figure 5. One uses the chamber pressure
residual as its input, the other, mixture ratio
residual. Each classifier network has two output
nodes, each of which is associated with either an
OPOV stuck or FPOV stuck condition. During
training, a residual pattern representing a failure
condition is applied to the input level and a 1
3
indicating complete activation is compared to the
corresponding output node. Back propagation is
used to adjust the network weightings. Two second
level networks, one for each failure, are used to
determine the setting, in degrees, at which the valve
is stuck. Each lower level network has three output
nodes corresponding to different levels of severity,
that is valve opening, and were trained in a similar
manner. Each of the four networks has 200 input
nodes and 20 hidden layer nodes in their
architecture. The input to each network is a time
sequence of residuals of length 200. The time step
between residuals is 0.04 secs with the total
sequence time representing 8 secs.
Test data with severity levels not used in
training were used with the networks with
successful results. Figure 6 and 7 illustrate the
results obtained for inputs of residual patterns for
OPOV stuck at 47.5 degrees and FPOV stuck at 55
degrees. In both cases the networks correctly
identify both the failure types and their severity.
CONCLUSION
A conceptual design of a model based FDDS is
developed for the SSME. This design relies heavily
on the accurate and reliable identification of the
parameters of the highly nonlinear and very
complex SSME. The design approach was
presented in some detail and preliminary results for
a failed valve were presented. These preliminary
results verify that the developed parameter
identification technique can be used for this
purpose. Additional simulation studies are needed,
using the failure data generated with the nonlinear
simulation, to completely verify the validity of the
failure detection concept presented in the paper.
Also, additional research is required to incorporate
more failure modes.
Both the point models and the state variable
f'dters provide accurate representation of the
nonlinear simulation within acceptable error limits.
However, research continues to improve their
accuracy by identifying nominal models using
multi-level, pseudo-random sequences as the
driving signals. Further study is also needed to
determine the capability of the neural network to
recognize failure patterns for failure diagnosis
purposes.
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Figure 2.mComparison of the responses of the linked
model and the filter with the nonlinear simulation.
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model and the filter with the nonlinear simulation.
12
0.150
II
i
0.100
0.0_0
-0.00@
-0.100
-O.ISO
Normal
4_,0 Del. /"-_
4_,.oi),l I \
....... 4e.oD.r I \
500 Del-
•,) \
_. J.?, \
:',t,,: ',, \
: \ .-' /.\ ', /\
I_ : ,'/- "_ : "-
/_'':tL i . '_,-_;_" \ """\
_l o - - ° " " " " "* •
, I I....._/ \ I
_ _. l j _I \-_
1 2 3 4 S 6 '7 B 9 iO li
Time (',e¢)
12
(a) PC residues for OPOV stuck at various angles.
0.404)
li
ti
0.350
0.300
0.250
0.200
0.150
Normal
_3.0 De I.
_.o D,,r J\" ,,[I
'_ ....... 57.5 Dell. / I
[1 511i.5 Dee. // I
/I -\ 1
i/ \ / \
/ \ / _l
/ _" /
/ \ r/ ,..,-_.,, t
/ \ / .J _,J \q
• _ /" I Ir .I ! \ _ /'J
' ii i" t I
• i "'_'\. \"-.,I / ..', .
i \ I f. "" "" t_._
I1.1" . \ I._ /. ,, ,,,..,
" \ " I"" ' II X..... '" '
• ...- i , .-'* i
L. ..' i,..-',___.__-_k/----. .." .---.. ',.-.,.'_
.....7I
-o.o-00_ ,,.,_, "/" ',,. ,'l
-0 lO0 _ i .... "'..__.."
o l z 3 4 5 e 7 II li lo li 12
Time (',ec)
(b) MR residues for FPOV stuck at various angles.
Figure 4.--Output residues for stuck valve failures.
CHAMBERPRESSURE
r ......... ..__!ESIDUAL
i CLASSIRER
i NETWORK
I .Ira
mY_
DETECTIONLOGIC
MIXTURERATIO
._. RESIDUAL
CLASSIRER
NETWORK CLASSIFIER LEVEL
SEVERITY LEVEL I
IF (FPOV STUCK)
NO FAILURE
IF (OPOV STUCK)
[I "-_I
I
I
I
SEVERITY
NETWORK J
SEVERITY
NETWORK
...[
1
I
i
I
! FPOVSEVERITY
OPOVSEVERITY
i=..._
w-,---
Figure 5.mNeural network architecture diagram.
o
;>
0
0
Z
1.0
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
!////
////
J////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
OPOV
o
:>
0
Z
0.0 0.0
FPOV 45°
0.99
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
////
_Ef
47 °
0.05
50°
(a) Fault Type Co) Severity
Figure 6.mResponses of the neural network to OPOV stuck
at 47.5 degrees.
10
,7.
7"1
m.
¢J'l ¢Q
¢.rlc
""I
c'_ o
O
¢.Q "-J
O
o33
O
f.O
"0
0
co
O
G0
0
O
O
C
i
O
O
0
77
-0
©
r--
v
<
D.
Network Output Value
< o
Network Output Value
v
Oo
O0
o
o
Report Documentation PageNational Aeronautics and
Space Administration
1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No, 3. Recipient's Catalog No.
NASA TM- 103607
5. Report Date4. Title and Subtitle
A Failure Diagnosis System Based on a Neural Network Classifier for
the Space Shuttle Main Engine
7. Author(s)
Ahmet Duyar and Walter Merrill
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio 44135-319t
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546-0001
6. Performing Organization Code
8. Performing Organization Report No.
E-5756
10. Work Unit No.
562-01-11
11. Contract or Grant No.
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
Technical Memorandum
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplementary Notes
Prepared for 29th Conference on Decision and Control sponsored by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Honolulu, Hawaii, December 5-7, 1990. Ahmet Duyar, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton,
Florida 33431; Walter Merrill, Lewis Research Center.
16. Abstract
A conceptual design of a model based failure detection and diagnosis system is developed for space shuttle main
engine. This design relies on the accurate and reliable identification of parameters of the highly nonlinear and
very complex engine. The design approach was presented in some detail and results for a failed valve are
presented. These preliminary results verify that the developed parameter identification technique together with a
neural network classifier can be used for this purpose.
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s))
SSME; Model; Neural network; Failure;
Diagnosis; Real time
18. Distribution Statement
Unclassified- Unlimited
Subject Category 20
19, Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of pages
Unclassified Unclassified 12
NASAFO_M16a6oct 86 *For sale by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161
22. Price*
A03
